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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROYAL NORDELL ALLRED,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO.

15688

MARK E. COOK, BRYANT MADSEN,
KENNETH R. STRATE and TOM
MOWER,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for slander.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Each of the defendants made motions to dismiss plaintifrs
Complaint which the court granted by written order on the 24th
day of February, 1978.

Arguments of all parties were submitted

in writing. The court concluded that the statements alleged to
have been made by defendants did not amount to actionable libel
or slander and that defendants were immune because of their capacity as school board members. There was neither testimony,
other evidence or oral argument submitted to the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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district court and remand to the district court for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are contained in plaintiff's Complaint. For the
purpose of considering whether plaintiff's Complaint should have
been dismissed, the allegations of the Complaint must be taken
as true. As part of his statement of facts, plaintiff herewith
incorporates said Complaint (R 1-5) as though set forth herein
in full. Briefly summarized the facts are as follows.
Prior to the incidents in question, plaintiff enjoyed an
outstanding reputation in his profession (Educator) and in his
community (Mt. Pleasant City and Sanpete County, Utah), and beyond. The defendants Cook, Madsen and Strate were members of the
North Sanpete Board of Education. On or about May 23, 1977, they
asked plaintiff to join them in their auto in a parking lot. When
he did, they told him:
"You have interfered with us for the last time,
we want your resignation".
The defendant Madsen added:
"And we want it within twenty-four (24) hours".
When plaintiff asked the reason, the defendant Cook said:
"We have twenty-seven (27) charges against you
and if you do not resign, we will bring those
charges out in public at the next Board meeting".
(The next Board meeting would occur on May 26, 1977, three days
later.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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The defendant Strate said:
"I feel I have to go along with these men in this
problem".
Thereafter, the defendants and each of them, told many persons of
their claim that they had twenty-seven (27) charges against plaintiff that would be brought out publicly in the next public meeting of the Board, which resulted in a public outcry. The defendant Strate in a Spring City town meeting, called by interested
citizens, told the meeting which consisted of forty (40) to sixty
(60) people, that:
"That they (defendants) had twenty-seven (27) charges
against the Superintendant (plaintiff)", and further
invited the people to:
"Come to the Board meeting and see what they are".
(Referring to the Board meeting of May 26, 1977).
Thereafter said defendants publicly denied they had said charges
but privately started, fed and encouraged rumors that they had such
charges but could not bring them out because of possible legal consequences.
Plaintiff's Complaint further alleged that said statements were
made intentionally, deliberately, maliciously and recklessly to injure
plaintiff and his reputation as an educator and in the community.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleged there was a large public outcry
and he was in fact damaged in his reputation by persons who believed
the statements in question directly, and by persons who did not believe,
because to them he was rendered "controversial".
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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While plaintiff contends the following facts relate to
matters of privilege and/or immunity which are matters of defense, they are herewith offered for clarification. Plaintiff does
not herewith undertake any factual burdens which are not his by
law or the rules of court.
At the time of the utterances complained of, plaintiff's
c~ntract had less than sixty (60) days to run.

(The utterances

were on May 23, 1977 and later, and plaintiff's contract expired
at the end of June, 1977.) The school board had been sharply divided on many issues -- the three defendant members opposed to the
remaining two members. One of the matters about which they were
divided was their respective support and non-support for the
plaintiff Superintendant. Accordingly, the three defendant members
could not remove plaintiff for cause because they require a twothirds (2/3) vote, wt-.ich :hev did not have (UCA 53-6-7). They were
too late to fail to renew his contract because the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act UCA 53-51-5-(2) and (5) required
both a notice of intent not to renew sixty (60) days prior to the
expiration of the contract and another notice thirty (30) days
prior to that.
It follows that at the time of the utterances complained of
the defendant school board members were attempting to accomplish
by malicious coercion and slander what they could not accomplish
by motion and vote in their role as school board members.
Said matters were pointed out to the court by defendants and ~··
plaintiff (R 59). They were ·well known in the community and may constitute
part
of Law
theLibrary.
context
which
the
considered
this matte
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ARGUMENT
I

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS CONSTITUTE ACTIONABLE SLANDER PER SE.
Defendants claim that they published no slander because they
did not communicate any specific wrongdoing on the part of the
plaintiff. But where the words complained of convey a defamatory
inference, they are actionable although there is no specific allegation.
"For to render a defamatory statement actionable,
it is not necessary that the charge be made in a
direct,positive, and open manner. If the words
used, when taken in their ordinary acceptation convey a defamatory imputation, no matter how indirectly, they are actionable, and it matters not how artfully their meaning is concealed or disguised. A
mere inference, implication, or insinuation is as
actionable as a positive assertion if the meaning
is plain. The test is whether the words, taken in
the sense in which they are reasonably understood
under the circumstances by persons familiar with
the language used, are capable of a defamatory construction."
50 Am.Jur.2d§l3p528-9

When the defendant school board members told the plaintiff:
"You have interfered with us for the last time", and then stated,
"We have twenty-seven charges against you and if you do not resign,
we will bring those charges out in public at the next Board meeting", the thrust of their threat was that the plaintiff would be
forced to resign if he did not do so immediately. Either the
charges would reveal acts or an act sufficient to allow them to
remove him from his position as Superintendant for cause, or
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the revelation of the charges would induce him to resign because
of his public shame. The defendants' characterization of their
actions in their Memoranda in lower court makes it clear that this
is the interpretation they intended. Defendant Madsen reports the
allegations as being that "[they had]

'charges' against the plain-

tiff, presumably sufficient to justify his removal from office as
Superintendant". After speaking to the plaintiff, defendants repeated to numerous people that they had twenty-seven charges against
the plaintiff, and invited them to the next Board meeting (three
days later) to hear what they were. An obvious inference that many
persons in the community believed and that defendants intended them
to believe was that the school board had twenty-seven criminal
charges against the plaintiff. But the defendants have consistently
refused to speci.fv

an~'

charges. On several occasions they have said n:

in school board meetings they did not have twenty-seven charges
against the plaintiff; at other times they have said they did.
(Defendant Cook has specifically denied the existence of any charges
in a deposition given in another case relating to the same nucleus
of facts from which this case arose). Defendants at no time had
grounds to remove the Superintendent from his position for cause,
nor did they have any charges which if publicly proven would have
induced him to resign his office. Thus the statement that twentyseven charges existed is both false on its face and false in what
must necessarily be inferred from it. The plaintiff respectfully
contends that the question of whether defendants' words, as they
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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reasonably understood under the circumstances, were defamatory,
is one of fact, and that a jury should be allowed to decide it.
Because of the great public interest in education, statements
imputing inefficiency or lack of qualification to a school teacher
or school official tend to injure the teacher in his occupation or
profession. For this reason such statements are actionable. An ALR
annotation entitled Libel and Slander: Actionability of Statements
Imputing Inefficiency or Lack of Qualification. 40

A~R

3d490

(The annotation included cases involving Principals and Superintendants as part of Public School Teachers) is in point on this question and gives examples of statements about school personnel that
have been held to be actionable slander per se. An examination of
them shows that specific allegations of wrongdoing are not necessary
and that statements weaker than those involved here have been held
to be actionable per se.
a. "incompetent" (p.493)
b. "weak spot in system" (p.493)
c. "insufficient and inadequate with students" (p.493)
d. "Principal paid little attention to school and
less to teachers" (p.493)
e. "not competent and had little control over school"
(p.494)
The defendants by their conduct intentionally and deliberately
created in the minds of many the false impression that the plaintiff
in the conduct of his office had been, at best, greatly deficient,
and at worst, criminal. Having maliciously caused the kind of harm

-7-
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to a professional reputation that slander laws are designed to
protect against, the defendants should not be allowed to escape
liability because they refused to specify any wrongdoing. In
reality, defendants would have causedthe plaintiff less harm
if they had specified the charges, because he would have been
able to respond to them and clear his name. It strongly appears
that they did not specify charges because they had none.
The alleged slanders are per se, rather than per quod, because
they pertain directly to plaintiff's fitness for his office and
profession. The two definitions (suggested by defendants in their
Memoranda in lower court) of slander that is actionable per se
are as follows:
"(3) conduct, characteristics, or a condition
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful
business, trade, profession or office," 59 Am.Jur.
2d 524, §10 of "Libel & Slander".
"One who publishes a slander that ascribes to
anothersconduct, charactertistics or a condition that would adversely affect his fitness
for the proper conduct of his lawful business,
trade or profession, or of his public or private office ... is subject to liability without
proof of special harm," Restatement of Facts §573.
The notes to §573 make it clear that the slander must relate
to the plaintiff's professional reputation and not merely to his
character as an individual. The defendant school board members,
in implying that plaintiff Superintendant would not be able to
remain in office if he did not comply with their demands, obviously
intended to slander his fitness for the proper conduct of his office
Plaintiff contends that his Complaint states a claim for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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damages per se, but does not concede that he has not made a
claim for damages per quod.

ARGUMENT
II

DEFENDANTS WERE NEITHER IMMUNE NOR WERE THEIR STATEMENTS
PRIVILEGED, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ACTING IN THE COURSE OF THEIR
OFFICIAL DUTIES, THEY WERE NOT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH, AND THEY
WERE NOT WITHOUT MALICE.
Defendants claim separate defenses of statutory immunity
under the Governmental Immunity Act (UCA 63-39-10), which
excepts from waiver of immunity actions for libel and slander.
Both defenses are founded upon the need to permit public officials to freely exercise the lawful functions of their office
without fear of liability from an honest error in judgment, or
from an act that their duties required. Plaintiff concedes that if
the Board members were carrying out official duties at the time
of the alleged slanders, in good faith and without malice, they
are immune from plaintiff's action.
But the privilege or immunity extends only to the exercise of
official functions of their office. If they were not carrying out
their functions, or if they were, but were not doing so in good
faith, without malice, then no law or public policy protects
them. Their acts become those of individuals and not of the state.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The public interest is then best served by holding them liable
for their actions.
The lawful powers and duties of the school board regarding
termination and hiring of school superintendants are defined in
the Orderly School Termination Procedures Act (UCA 53, Chapter 51).
An examination of them reveals that defendant school board members
were not acting within the statutory requirements.
"(1) This act shall be known as the "Utah Orderly School
Termination Procedures Act."
(2) The purpose of this act is to require school districts
to adopt orderly termination procedures and to specify
standards of due process and causes for termination.
(3) (1) "Contract term" or"term of employment" means the
period of time an educator is engaged by the school district pursuant to a contract of employment whether oral
or written.
(3) (2) "Dismissal" or "termination" means:
(a) Any termination of the status of employment of
an educator.
(b) Failure to rene>i the employment contract of an
educator who pursuant to the employment practices of
the school district has a reasonable expectation of
continued employment in successive years.
(c) Reduction in salary of an educator not generally
applied to all educators of the same category in the
employ of the school district during such educator's
contract term.
(d) Change of assignment of an educator with an accompanying reduction in pay, unless such assignment
change and salary reduction is agreed to in writing.
(3) "Educator" or "teacher" means all teaching and
professional personnel of a school district who hold
a regular contract for positions requiring certification and valid certificates issued to them by the
state board of education.
(4) "C<;mtract classified school employees" mean all
educat~onal supportive employees, working under contract
w~th a school district.
(4) The board of education of each school district bv contract with its educators or their associations or bv
reso~uti?n of the board shall establish procedures for
term~nat~on of educators in an orderlv manner without
discrimination.
"
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At the time of the alleged slanders, plaintiff's contract
had less than two months to run. Defendants therefore were precluded from giving the required two monthsnotice, and also could
not give the notice required in Section 4 to be given one month
before the two montffinotice. They could not terminate plaintiff's
contract for cause because they did not have the two-third majority of the Board required to do so (UCA 53-6-7). Instead, they
attempted to force the plaintiff to resign by falsely claiming
that they had twenty-seven charges against him which they would
reveal at a public Board meeting if he did not resign. They were
attempting to accomplish by unfair coercion what they could not
accomplish by motion and vote.
Furthermore, they were entitled to deliberate only as a
Board. They had no right, duty, or authority to execute policies
lawfully adopted by the Board. They were even less entitled to
execute policies unilaterally conceived by them. The Utah case of
Roe v. Lundstrom 57 P.2d 1128, 89 Utah 720, in which the court considered the liability of individual members of the Logan City
Commission who at their own discretion caused Logan City police
officers to close a business claimed to be operating without a
license, delineates the difference between lawful actions by a
Board and unproper actions by individual board members.
"Now let us assume that the defendant commissioners
are charged with the duty of seeing that the ordinances are faithfully executed. In the exercise of
this power, they would necessarily have to act as a
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board and not informally and independently as individuals.
If we are to give effect to the provision that when power
is conferred upon the board of commissioners to perform
any act, they may provide by ordinance the manner and details necessary to the full exercise of such powers, then
an informal personal interference with the operation of
the police department or any directions to its officers
would appear to be wholly unjustified and entirely beyond
the powers conferred upon the board, or upon the individual
commissioners, as such ... "
The court concluded that the Commissioners were not immune
from liability because they were acting outside the scope of their
authority. In the instant case, the defendants did not merely exceed the scope of the school board's authority to terminate or
remove the Superintendant, they deliberately attempted to subvert
the statutory requirements of notice and due process and accomplish
by coercion what they knew they could not get the Board to official!
do.
The unofficial character of the alleged activities of the defendants is further attesred to by their informal and even furtive
nature. The defendants spoke to the plaintiff in a parked car, in
violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. They employed
threats and malicious rumors. There was no official meeting, formal
resolution, or other color of official action.
The Public Employees Indemnification Act (UCA Ch. 63-48) is
not applicable to the defendants in this action, against because
they were not engaged in the performance of their duties. The Act
provides for suits to be defended by the government entity, and
for judgments to be paid by the government entity, but only where
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the acts complained of were within the scope of employment. Consequently the claim of the defendants that although this suit is
against them as individuals, it is in substance gainst the school
board as a government entity because the school district would
be required to defend and indemnify the school board members has
no validity. To remove all doubt, plaintiff waived any claim against
the school board or district in his Complaint (R-5).
A claim of absolute privilege, in the minority of courts that
have recognized it, also requires that the official have been engaged in the performance of his duties. In McLaughlin v. Tilendis,
263 NE 2d 85 (Ill. 1969), the court held that it was within the
Superintendant's official duties to make recommendations concerning
teachers, and that any such statements were absolutely privileged.
In Smith v. Helbraun, 251 NYS 2d 533 (NY 1964), the Board of Education
officially passed a resolution stating that greater progress could
be made in solving educational problems of the district under new
leadership and that the presence of the plaintiff Superintendent of
Schools of the District was detrimental to the best interests of the
school district and to the education of the children. No such official
action characterizes the defendants' conduct in the instant case.
Most jurisdictions impose a good faith requirement on claims of
immunity by public officials, making the privilege enjoyed by them
conditional and not absolute. Appellant contends that Utah is among
them. Most of the cases cited by defendants in support of their claims
of privilege and immunity contain the good faith requirement. See
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Anderson v. Granite School District, 413 P.2d 597, 17 Utah 2d
405 (1966), Roe v. Lundstrom, 57 E 2d 1128, 89 Utah 720, Rosendnal
Mining and Const. Co. v. Holman,

503 P.2d 446, 28 Utah 2d 396

(1972), and Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d 367, 21 Utah 2d 314.
The Anderson case, which dealt with the liability of school board
members, stated the rule as follows:
"it is the federal policy of the law that when a public
official ac~in good faith, believing what he does
within the scope of his authority and in the line of his
duty, he is not liable for damages even if he makes a
mistake in the exercise of his judgment." 413 P. 2d at 599.
The two cases cited by defendants which do not contain a good faith
requirement, Anderson Investment Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 379, 503
P.2d 144 (1972) and Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 43, 134 P 626,
(1913) do not signify that there is no good faith requirement. The
Anderson case cites Sheffield v. Turner, supra, which squarely
announces a good faith qualification. The Wilkinson case is an old
one (1913), it is prior to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and
does not deal with the good faith problem at all.
A recent case in a close neighboring jurisdiction that deals
directly with the question of good faith and conditional privilege
in a school situation is Gardner v. Hollifield, 549 P.2d 266, 97
Idaho 607 (1976). In that case the Idaho Court reversed a summary
judgment in favor of the school board. The claimed utterance was
that plaintiff
"was uncompetent as a school teacher and not doing a competent
job."
The court in finding defendants' conditional privilege lost,
-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pointed out its holding in an earlier Barton case as follows:
"Can the motives and purposes of a school board, when
performing an official act clearly within their powers
under the law be put in issue in an action for damages
under the charge of civil libel? The answer must inevitably be in the negative. They have no right to employ libelous language in the performance of their official duties
and cannot shield themselves behind their official character
where they have overstepped their authority or exercised
official powers in an unlawful manner, but so long as their
acts are clearly within the purview of the statute and are
such as they have an unquestioned right to perform, they
should not be subject to an action for libel on the charge
of conspiracy or malice in doing the act." 21 Ida. at 617618, 123 P. at 480 (emphasis in original omitted.)
"In our earlier opinion in Gardner v. Hollifield supra, we
pointed out that Barton would not allow the use of defamatory language violative of the conditional privilege. A
conditional privilege may be lost when a speaker on an
otherwise privileged occasion publishes false and defamatory matter concerning another which either (a) he in fact
does not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds
for believing it to be true. See Gardner v. Hollifield, 96
Ida. at 612, 533 P.2d 730: Barlow v. International Harvester
Co., 95 Ida. 881, 892, 522 P.Zd 1102, 1113 (1974); Ranous v.
HUghes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966); Prosser, Torts
(4th ed. 1971) Sec. ll5; Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 492 (1969);
Annot., 40A.L.R.3d 490 (1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Sec. 600 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
The defendants would have acted in good faith only had they
brought charges pursuant to an effort to remove plaintiff for cause,
(which they knew they could not accomplish) and only if they had
given him notice and allowed him a hearing in which to respond to
them, as the statute, supra, required. Even if the statute had not
so required, Board of Regents v. Roth, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972)
clearly imposes notice and due process requirements wherever there
is a possibility of a stigma that will affect future employment.
If they were not attempting to remove the plaintiff for cause,
they had no right to do more than request his resignation. But
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they did more than that, they slandered plaintiff when they claimed
to have twenty-seven charges against him that they would make public
at an upcoming meeting if he did not immediately resign. That they
thereafter denied they had such charges in public and said they did
have them in private was obviously done in an attempt to inflict
personal pain or to 1.mfairly coerce plaintiff to act contrary to his
own will, or both. The question of good faith is usually one of fact,
and plaintiff respectfully contends that it should not be decided
by the court on Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure
to State a Claim. 59 Am.Jur.§l97.
SUMMARY

The utterances complained of were defamatory, and since they
were obviously intended to call into question plaintiff's fitness
for his profession, they are actionable per se.
Defendants cannot

clai~

a conditional privilege or statutory

imm1.mity because they were not acting within

tre scope of their

authority. If they had a privilege, they lost it by their bad faith
and malice.
All of the issues argued herein are at the very least questions
of fact, and should not be summarily disposed without trial.
Respectfully submitted

Appellant.
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